1976

Following unanimous 9 March recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice of the CDC, for whose members “the odds of a catastrophic flu epidemic had risen to a near-certainty” (Kolata, 139, 145), and accompanying nine-page memorandum by CDC head David Sencer (his “action memorandum” (144), U.S. President Gerald Ford announces swine flu vaccination campaign. Then, following refusal of insurers to provide coverage to the four vaccine manufacturers, Ford signed into law on 12 August a bill whereby the federal government would provide liability coverage from claims resulting from the vaccine. First immunizations on 1 October  three deaths of elderly people in Pittsburgh  suspension of swine flu campaign in Allegheny County and nine states. “The press began a national body count” (Kolata, 164-165). On 16 December, by which time 40 million Americans had received the swine flu vaccine, the CDC, led by Sencer, ended the immunization campaign, by which time not a single case of swine flu had been reported. The reason was reports of Guillain-Barré syndrome (GB) among immunized people. But many experts disputed the causal relation between the vaccine and GB, arguing that the disease was poorly described, and doctors – newly sensitized following the CDC’s disclosure – could include a variety of symptoms under the rubric of GB. Moreover, the primary symptoms of GB – nerve weakness and weakened reflexes – were associated with diseases other than GB. Finally, the alarm came about because the Minnesota physician who first reported GB in a flu shot patient “misheard” an audio tape (172-173). Withal, the CDC concluded that the vaccine increased the risk of getting GB eightfold, with the risk period extending 10 weeks after immunization. Other virologists and epidemiologist supported the causal connection, and “a tidal wave of litigation” ensured, as vaccinated people with putative GB demanded compensation from the federal government (174ff.).